

The Jordanian Nationalism

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Introduction

In the 19th century, the ideologies developed in Europe appeared in the Middle East as a consequence of Napoléon's campaign in Egypt. During the century one of these ideologies became the most dominant thought in the Arab world. The first thinkers and political agitators of nationalism, such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani or Mohammed 'Abdu, recognized the cultural threat of the West, focused on the resurgence of Islam and advocated the unity of the Islam world. According to al-Afghani's Pan-Islamism, only the unified Islam world would be able to confront Western colonialism.¹

By the end of the 19th century, the decline of the Ottoman Empire made the Arabic-speaking political thinkers urge to focus on the ethnic and linguistic differences between the Arabs and the Turkish. 'Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi, who is usually regarded as the precursor of Arabism or Arab nationalism, emphasised that the resurgence of Islam should be necessarily led by the Arab people. He stated that the caliphate should bring back to the Hejaz and an Arab from the descendants of the Prophet should be elected as caliph.² Later, Sati' al-Husri, the most significant theorist of Arab nationalism, had already emphasized the importance of Arab unity and declared that Islam unity would not a realistic prospect.³ On the eve of World War I, Arab nationalism became a very popular movement in the Middle East and the Arab leaders utilised some of its elements to their political goals against the Ottomans.

Sharif Hussein, who was appointed as Emir of Mecca by the Ottoman Sultan right after the Young Turk revolution, 1908, had secret relations with the British during World War I. The correspondence between Sharif Hussein and High Commissioner Henry McMahon contains Britain's misty promise about a future Arab Khalifate that would have involved the whole Arabian Peninsula and the Fertile Crescent (without Egypt).⁴ Finally, Hussein, who hoped that he could establish the long-dreamed khalifate after the war, launched the Arab Revolt in 1916 against the Ottomans supported by the British.

However, the Great Powers had already decided to divide the Middle Eastern territories of the Ottoman Empire among each other⁵ and had never had the intention to let an inde-

¹ Dawisha, *Arab Nationalism*, 18-19.; Balogh András et al. *Nemzet és nacionalizmus*, 81.

² From the 16th century the Ottoman sultans had the title of caliph.

³ Dawisha, *Arab Nationalism*, 23.; Balogh et al., *Nemzet és nacionalizmus*, 85.

⁴ The Husayn-McMahon Correspondence, 1915-1916. In: Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East*, 13-17.; Kádár, Emir Abdallah's Early Political Career, 106-107.

⁵ See the Sykes-Picot Agreement, 1916. In Hurewitz, *Diplomacy...*, 18-22.

pendent Arab Khalifate be established. After the World War ended, the Great Power reshaped the map of the Middle East by establishing new Arab states. According to the newly formulated Mandate system, that was based upon the Sykes-Picot Agreement, Syria and Lebanon became French Mandate, and Britain received Palestine and Iraq.

Winston Churchill, Britain's secretary for the colonies, called upon the Cairo Conference in March 1921 to lay down the principles of Britain's Middle Eastern policy. Britain's primary strategic goal was to ensure the route from the Mediterranean Sea to the Persian Gulf, hence they decided to create a buffer state, and carved out Transjordan, the land beyond the River Jordan, from the Mandate of Palestine. Emir Abdallah, the second son of Sharif Hussein, was appointed as Emir of Transjordan. Thus, the Great Powers created the basis of the future nation-state system in the Middle East, which also meant that they sowed the seeds of regional nationalism.⁶

The Emirate of Transjordan

Before World War I, nobody could find a land called Transjordan and the people, who lived on that land, had never identified themselves as Transjordanians. This area was part of the Ottoman Empire with largely Bedouin inhabitants lived mostly in tribes who kept a few contacts with the Ottoman administration. Only the north-western residents had everyday relations with the larger towns of Damascus and Nablus, the southern tribes looked toward the Hijaz. No national movement, therefore, had emerged in the tribal society before the World War.⁷

In the moment of the creation of Transjordan, it was a poor, backward, and ungovernable country. Only the north-western part of the desert country was available for agricultural production, and the harvest largely depended on the annual rainfall. The inhabitants were divided among numerous semi-nomadic Bedouin tribes, only a little part of the population lived settled lifestyle in the Ajlun region in the north. The rivalry between the tribes was part of the everyday life and the individuals' sense of social identity determined by tribal affiliation. Social services, like education and health services, were almost non-existent, and illiteracy was extremely high.⁸

During the post-war negotiations between Britain and the local leaders, the latter insisted on having a high-ranking Arab leader as head of a new state. In my opinion this indicates that the inhabitants of the future Emirate started to think in more nationalistic terms.⁹ Emir Abdallah seemed the right candidate for this position. He was one of the members of the Hashemite family, so he was a direct descendant the Prophet Mohammed. Traditionally, the Ottomans always appointed a Hashemite as Emir of Mecca throughout the centuries. During the Arab Revolt, Abdallah stayed in the Hijaz and tried to restrain the Saudi expansion, but his troops were defeated in two battles in 1919 that Abdallah barely survived the campaign. Shortly after that he probably decided to leave the Hijaz, but he was waiting for the right time, the time when his brother, Emir Feisal, had to escape from Damascus in

⁶ Abu-Odeh, *Jordanians*, 7-8.

⁷ Anderson, Betty S. *Nationalist Voices*, 15.

⁸ Abu-Odeh, *Jordanians, Palestinians*, 13.; Robins, Philip. *A History of Jordan*, 23.

⁹ Anderson, *Nationalist Voices*, 15.

summer 1920.¹⁰ Abdallah reached Ma'an (an important town in the southern part of Transjordan) in the late autumn 1920 with some 2.000 armed men. In Ma'an he tried to earn the local leaders' support and came into contact with British diplomats, too. His arrival coincided with Britain's need to decide the future of their Mandates. Since the local leaders warmly welcomed and supported Abdallah after his arrival in Amman, Secretary Churchill invited the Emir to Jerusalem at the end of March 1921 and appointed him as Emir of Transjordan.

At first Transjordan played the role of a buffer state and military base between Palestine, Iraq and the Saudi territories. For this purpose, the British created the Arab Legion led and educated by British army officers. By the mid-1920s, Transjordan concluded the negotiations with Abdel Aziz ibn Saud on the southern borders of Transjordan. In 1928, Britain and Transjordan signed the Anglo-Transjordanian Treaty that laid down the rights and obligations of the Emir and the relation between the two states. The same year the newly established Transjordanian Parliament adopted the Organic Law functioned as a constitution. Hence, the process of making a state finished just at the end of the 1920s.¹¹

Transjordanian Nationalism vs Hashimite Pan-Arabism

As I mentioned before, the reshaping of the map of the Middle East created the possibility of the development of regional nationalisms. By the end of the 1920s, Transjordan drew its border lines and "those who came within the boundaries of the Jordanian state became potential citizens of the nation".¹² Through the years of the Mandate, however, the development of the sense of Transjordanian identity was a slow process.

Firstly, the society of Transjordan was mostly tribal, and the inhabitants' identity tied to their tribe. Moreover, there were no any nationalist leaders in the country before, the only demand of the Transjordanian towns (such as Kerak, Salt) was the appointment of an Arab prince as Emir of the new state at the end of 1920, as it was mentioned before. It was a hard task to create a new national identity instead of tribal identity. Emir Abdallah solved this problem by nominating the tribal leaders (the sheikhs) to high government and administrative positions. Unavoidably, these government officials began to identify themselves nationally Transjordanian.¹³ Thus, the borders drawn and the state institutes created in the 1920s, in one word, the making of the Transjordanian state was one of the supra-tribal institutes that paved the way for the national identity.

Another component was the Emir himself, who was not a Transjordanian¹⁴ but gained his legitimacy from the origin of his family and the Arab Revolt. For the local sheikhs, he was "a revered chief who deserved their loyalty and submission".¹⁵

¹⁰ Emir Feisal, third son of Sharif Hussein, was proclaimed as King of Syria by the Arab National Congress. The French, however, invaded Damascus in the summer of 1920, and exiled Feisal from the town.

¹¹ Kádár, *Emir Abdallah's*, 111.

¹² Anderson, *Nationalist Voices*, 16.

¹³ Anderson, *Nationalist Voices*, 18.

¹⁴ Abdallah was born in Mecca in 1882 and educated in Istanbul. After his father, Sharif Hussein was appointed as Emir of Mecca, Abdallah became representative of the Hijaz in the Ottoman parliament. He served in the Arab Revolt during World War I.

The Arab Legion was also a supra-tribal structure. The British and Abdallah established this army in 1923 to defend Britain's strategic interest and the integrity of the state. The Legion was commanded and trained by British army officers from the beginning, but the core of the army consisted of Arab officers and soldiers of many different origins (Lebanese, Syrian, Transjordanian, Palestinian, and Hijazi), most of them served in Emir Feisal's army in Damascus before his dismissal. However, Britain put pressure on the Emir to remove these nationalist members from the Legion and increase its number with local tribesmen. When Major John Glubb¹⁶ arrived in Transjordan in 1930, he created the Desert Patrol within the Arab Legion in order to protect the boundaries and oil pipeline connecting Kirkuk and Haifa. This group that later reorganized as Desert Mechanized Force consisted only Bedouins and played a significant role in protecting internal security. Hence, the Arab Legion became one of the essential pillars of the state of Transjordan. Besides, it was also active in making a sense of Transjordanian identity by incorporating the tribes into the state structures. The Bedouins, who served in the Legion, began to identify themselves as Transjordanian.¹⁷

Overall, these three supra-tribal institutes (the state, the Emir, and the Arab Legion) formed the basis of the Transjordanian national identity. Although, Emir Abdallah had never committed himself to Transjordanian nationalism because he had large-scale Middle Eastern ambitions: to create Greater Syria. His entire political thought that could be called Hashemite Pan-Arabism, based on the future unity of the Middle Eastern Arab states (Palestine, Transjordan, Lebanon, Iraq and Syria). Abdallah could rely on the Arab Legion, that was not only playing a role in defending internal security but also symbolized the political power of the Emir.¹⁸ Hence, Emir Abdallah hindered the growth of Transjordanian nationalism since he focused on his Pan-Arab ambitions, moreover, to emphasize his commitment, he had never appointed any politician of Transjordanian origin as prime minister.¹⁹

Abdallah looked toward Palestine as a first step to unify the Arab states. Although drawing the international border between Palestine and Transjordan in the 1920s caused the beginning of the division of the people. The roots of Palestinian national identity, of course, had already appeared but the connection between the two states was still strong during the Mandate. On the one hand, both countries were under the British Mandate, and the two administrations always cooperated. The Transjordanian British resident was dependent on the High Commissioner in Palestine. Moreover, Palestinian officials were often appointed to the Transjordanian administration as well. Emir Abdallah's ambitions toward Palestine also strengthened the Palestinian–Transjordanian relations. The Emir built strong political connections with prominent Palestinians, chiefly those who did not agree with Grand Mufti

¹⁵ Abu-Odeh, *Jordanians, Palestinians*, 18.

¹⁶ John Bagot Glubb is a British army officer who served in the Western Front during World War I. In 1920, he was sent to Iraq, and then, in 1930 arrived in Transjordan where he founded the Desert Patrol within the Arab Legion. This group consisted of bedouins. In 1939, he was appointed as commander of the Arab Legion. He served in Jordan until his dismissal in 1956.

¹⁷ Abu-Odeh, *Jordanians, Palestinians*, 17-18.; Anderson, *Nationalist Voices*, 18.

¹⁸ Massad, Joseph A., *Colonial Effects*, 223.; Abu-Odeh, *Jordanians, Palestinians*, 17.

¹⁹ Abu-Odeh, *Jordanians, Palestinians*, 20.

Amin al-Husseini's²⁰ policy. On the other hand, the two people of the countries looked at each other as Arab brothers. The Transjordanian people supported the Palestinian opposition to Zionism and tried to send them arms and money during the Arab Rebellion in the 1930s, but the Arab Legion hindered it, even the Transjordanian government, as an ally of the British Mandatory system, arrested Palestinian insurgents.²¹

During the Arab Rebellion, the report of the Palestine Royal Commission, as known as the Peel Commission, appreciated Abdallah's role in Palestine. The commission suggested the annexation of the Arab part of Palestine to Transjordan²² under the reign of Emir Abdallah who immediately urged the British government to establish "a unified Arab kingdom composed of Palestine and Transjordan under royal Arab rule".²³ However, Abdallah had to wait ten more years.

Ten years later, in 1947, the United Nations General Assembly adopted its famous partition plan. Transjordan in the meantime became an independent state, and Abdallah proclaimed himself as king. After the adoption of the partition plan, King Abdallah initiated negotiations with the British and the Jewish Agency as well, to win their support.

In February 1948, Abdallah sent his prime minister and Glubb to negotiate with Britain. Abdallah needed open support from the British to take control over the Arab part of Palestine after the evacuation of British forces. Britain, in theory, stood by Abdallah's plan and warned him about the vacuum of power when Britain would leave the area.

Abdallah also had secret negotiations with the Jewish Agency. The king assured Golda Meir that he supported the partition plan. Both parties opposed to the possible establishment of a Palestinian state and looked at Grand Mufti al-Husseini as a common enemy. However, Abdallah thought that the establishment of the Jewish state was still too early and suggested her a peaceful settlement. According to Abdallah, an undivided Palestinian state should be created, where the Arab Legion would ensure internal security and the Jews would have autonomy. Within a year this state would unify with Transjordan, and Jews would receive the half of seats in the Parliament and a not-determined number of seats in the cabinet. In Abdallah's opinion, they could have avoided the outbreak of the war.²⁴ The Jewish Agency, however, was to create a Jewish state, so, at the end of the meeting, Abdallah assured Meir that, after the war broke out, the operations of the Arab Legion would not touch Jewish territories.

There was a third factor Abdallah wanted to stand on his side: the newly formed Arab League, the loose confederation of the Arab countries established in 1945. Its decision-making process was slow and depended on the different ambitions and the interests of the members. After long negotiations, Abdallah won the majority of the League, and in April

²⁰ Amin al-Husseini was a Palestinian politician who became the first spokesman of the Palestinian nationalism. He was appointed as Grand Mufti of Jerusalem in 1921. After the Palestinian Arab Rebellion between 1936 and 1939, he was forced to live in exile. During World War II, he collaborated with the Nazi Germany in Iraq. He was Emir Abdallah's political rival, and according to some hypothesis, he ordered Abdallah's assassination in 1951.

²¹ Abu-Odeh, *Jordanians, Palestinians*, 28-29.

²² See the Report of the Palestine Royal Commission in: Lugosi, *Dokumentumok*, 158-181.

²³ Massad, *Colonial Effects*, 226.

²⁴ Abu-Odeh, *Jordanians, Palestinians*, 36.

1948, Abdallah was appointed as namely general commander of the all-Arab expeditionary forces.²⁵

When the first Arab-Israeli war broke out on 15th May 1948, the Arab Legion, alongside with the Iraqi army, invaded the Arab territories of Palestine as a first step toward annexation. The situation, though, was more complicated. Abdallah considered himself the only who represented the Palestinians, but his opposition, that was supported by especially Egypt, established in September 1948 the General Palestine Government. It called upon a conference in Gaza in order to gain the support of the Palestinians. However, Abdallah convened another conference in Amman at the same time and, using the military situation in Palestine, prevented and/or forced the Palestinian delegates to go to Gaza, but to Amman. The Amman conference adopted a resolution that Abdallah had “full and absolute authority to speak on behalf of the Arabs of Palestine” and he was their representative. However, it was only a prelude before the Jericho Conference on 1st December 1948. Some 2.000 Palestinian delegates participated at the conference that called for a Palestinian–Jordanian unity on its resolution and declared Abdallah as “king of all Palestine”.²⁶

The war ended by signing Armistice Agreements between Israel and the Arab states in the spring of 1949. According to the Israeli–Transjordanian Armistice Agreement, Transjordan kept authority over the Arab areas of Palestine, also called as the West Bank. This area was smaller than determined in the UN partition plan, because Israel, using its military and political advantages, increased its territory. One year later, the Jordanian Parliament officially annexed the West Bank. The state was renamed as the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan that symbolized the beginning of a new era.

The struggle of the three ideologies

As a consequence of the first Arab-Israeli war and the unification of the two banks of Jordan, the population of the kingdom rose to approximately 1.270.000 people. At the end of the 1940s, Transjordan had 375.000 inhabitants, while the West Bank had 425.000. During and after the war, however, almost 360.000 refugees entered the West Bank from the areas occupied by Israel, and another 110.000 refugees arrived to Transjordan (East Bank).²⁷ This posed demographic, socio-economic, and even ideological challenges for the state.

The Palestinians received Jordanian citizenship and the right to vote which was the political-ideological basis of the unity of the two banks.²⁸ However, the seats in the Jordanian Parliament divided equally between the East and West Bank; in other words, the 375.000 Transjordanian had also 20 seats like 900.000 Palestinians.²⁹ In the mind of the state, every citizen of the Kingdom was Jordanian; it did not matter which bank they live in. In the political dialogue and the textbooks, there was no reference to Palestinians.³⁰ It was the essence of Pan-Jordanism, or Pan-Jordanian nationalism: “The state’s goal was less to impose

²⁵ Abu-Odeh, *Jordanians, Palestinians*, 36-39.

²⁶ Massad, *Colonial Effects*, 226-229.; Robins, *A History of Jordan*, 71-72.

²⁷ Massad, *Colonial Effects*, 233.

²⁸ Brand, *A Crisis of Identity*, 47.

²⁹ Robins, *A History of Jordan*, 73.

³⁰ Nasser, *Palestinian Identity*, 68.

on Palestinians a Transjordanian identity than to create a hybrid Jordanian identity for both communities.”³¹

Through the next two decades, in the 1960s and 1970s, an ideological struggle took place between Pan-Jordanism, Palestinian nationalism, and Pan-Arabism. Jordanian identity, in practice, “meant a simultaneous cooperation and repression of an independent Palestinian identity”³² that based on not only the land of Palestine but the trauma of the loss of homeland and injustice.³³ In the early 1950s, most of the Palestinians could accept their new status as Jordanian citizens but, of course, they were not satisfied with their situation.³⁴ They did not identify themselves as Jordanian and looked at King Abdallah as a traitor. Through the years, the sense of Palestinian identity formed, and those who identify themselves as Palestinian divide into three groups. According to this, those Arabs who stayed within the Armistice Lines after the first Arab-Israeli war and lived in Israel; those who lived in the Gaza Strip or the West Bank occupied by Israel in 1967; and those who left homes after the wars and live as refugees could be regarded as Palestinian.³⁵

Until the early 1960s Palestinian nationalists stood by Pan-Arabism as well, so it is hard to separate these two ideologies. Pan-Arabism had risen in the 1950s and merged with the person of the Egyptian President. Gamal Abd el-Nasser became one of the most significant Middle Eastern politicians referred to as the unofficial leader of Pan-Arabism. The political struggle between Nasser and the Hashemite monarchy was a determining factor of this period called the Arab Cold War.³⁶ After the establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) in 1964, the growth of Palestinian national consciousness accelerated, and after the Six-Day War, which was another trauma for the Arab world, Palestinian identity definitely separated from Jordanianness. Even, Palestinian nationalism constituted one of the greatest threats to security, peace and the reign of the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan.

What were the main political events, main ruptures of the struggle between Jordanians and Palestinians? The first event occurred one year after the annexation of the West Bank, when King Abdallah was assassinated by a young Palestinian in 1951 in Jerusalem. This was the first symbolic sign that Palestinians were not satisfied with their situation in Jordan. Jordanian citizens (the East Bankers) could never forgive this murder to the Palestinians. It was even thought that Amin al-Husseini ordered the assassination. Nevertheless, the monarchy continued to propagate its ‘two banks, one people’ ideology.

In the mid-1950s, the young King Hussein³⁷ had to face the challenge of the rise of radical Pan-Arab nationalism. His nationalist opposition demanded to break Jordan’s relations with Britain. In March 1956, he dismissed John Glubb and all British officers from the Arab Legion, and the intelligence. The king had personal conflict with Glubb about the leadership of the army and state, and Hussein wanted to assert his personal authority in Jor-

³¹ Brand, *A Crisis of Identity*, 50.

³² Nanes, *Hashemitism*, 163.

³³ Brand, *A Crisis of Identity*, 48-49.

³⁴ Massad, *Colonial Effects*, 235.

³⁵ Paragi, Beáta, *A palesztinai arabok*, 68.

³⁶ The phrase Arab Cold War was first used by Malcolm Kerr in his book. Kerr, *The Arab Cold War*, 1975.

³⁷ Hussein ibn Talal was King Abdallah’s grandson. Hussein was only 17 years old when the Jordanian Parliament dethroned his father because of his mental illness, and declared Hussein as king of Jordan in 1952.

dan.³⁸ Hussein thought that he could hinder to a further rise of Pan-Arab nationalism in Jordan, but even so, the radical nationalist parties won the October elections, and Suleiman Nabulsi became prime minister of Jordan. Nabulsi was the leader of the National Socialist Party in Jordan and was an admirer of President Nasser. Nabulsi followed Nasser's Pan-Arab policy, cancelled the treaty with Britain and established political relations with the Soviet Union. King Hussein realized that the Nabulsi Government constituted a threat to the Hashemite monarchy, that was the reason why he dismissed Nabulsi in April 1957 and banned all political parties in Jordan and arrested most of the radical politicians. Jordan's new Western political ally, the United States, on the basis of the Eisenhower Doctrine, helped to rebuilt political stability in the country. The events of 1956 and 1957 made Palestinians more unsatisfied that increased the gap between them and Jordanians.

In the 1960s, the Palestinian national identity developed rapidly. The PLO gained increased significance after the Six-Day War. Israel occupied the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights, which made the Palestinians disappointed in Pan-Arab nationalism and made them recognize the necessity of establishing their own Palestinian state. That strengthened the development of Palestinian nationalism. During the war, some 300.000 refugees crossed over the River Jordan, caused socio-economic and political challenges for King Hussein. Through the next years, numerous Palestinian armed branches (some of that were members of the PLO) took control over a large part of Jordan. Finally, in 1970, King Hussein decided to expel PLO from Jordan (the so-called Black September).

Ideologically, the status of Jordanians with Palestinian origin was uncertain. They were loyal to the state of Jordan and the Hashemite monarchy, and many of them served in the Jordanian army. According to some accounts, the percentage of Palestinian in the military was between 45 and 60 per cent.³⁹ Anyway, Jordan gave up propagating the hybrid ideology of Pan-Jordanism, and Transjordanian nationalism rose again. Abu-Odeh emphasizes that Transjordanian nationalists had an aggressive attitude toward the Palestinians and looked at them as strangers.⁴⁰ However, a good portion of the nationalists remained Jordanian nationalists, and the monarchy kept representing Jordanianism as well. In November 1971, King Hussein convened the National Union Conference inviting some 2.500 Transjordanian and Palestinian representatives. Finally, the conference did not redefine the country's national identity, which is still waiting for a new definition.⁴¹

Conclusion

The reshaping of the Middle East after World War I, and the creation of the Emirate of Transjordan made the possibility for the development of Transjordanian national identity. The connection between the state, the Arab Legion and the residents of the country strengthened this sense. Emir Abdallah's Pan-Arab ambitions, however, were about to expand the nation well beyond the borders of Jordan. Hence, Pan-Jordanism was born by crossing Transjordanian nationalism and the Hashemite Pan-Arabism.

³⁸ Ashton, *King Hussein of Jordan*, 53.

³⁹ Massad, *Colonial Effects*, 240-241.; Nanes, Hashemitism, 186.

⁴⁰ Abu-Odeh, *Jordanians, Palestinians*, 257-258.

⁴¹ Massad, *Colonial Effects*, 247-248., 275.

Those Palestinians, who had moved to the East Bank after the first Arab-Israeli War, became loyal to the Jordanian state and identified themselves both as Jordanian and Palestinian. Their situation, however, was unclear after the expulsion of PLO because the Jordanian governments were not interested anymore in redefining Jordanian national identity.

To conclude, Stefanie Nanes emphasises that Palestinians remain an integral part of Jordan. The debate over Jordanian national identity is still going on. East Banker Palestinians suggest using another phrase for Jordanianity: Hashemitism that “may become the most viable means for Jordan to build a political community that includes all of its citizens, regardless of origin”.⁴²

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⁴² Nanes, Hashemitism, 187.

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Le nationalisme jordanien

Au 19^e siècle, les idéologies développées en Europe ont apparu en Moyen-Orient comme une conséquence de la campagne française en Egypte. Pour la fin du 19^e siècle, le nationalisme arabe est devenu l'idéologie dominante, portant les traits caractéristiques d'un mouvement anti-ottoman. Pendant la Première Guerre mondiale, les Arabes s'efforçaient d'établir un Califat arabe et ont commencé la révolte arabe contre l'Empire ottoman avec le soutien des Forces de l'Entente. Cependant, le Califat ne pouvait pas se réaliser à cause des intérêts des Grandes Puissances qui ont réaménagé la carte du Moyen-Orient en établissant des nouveaux États arabes. Un des nouveaux États était justement la Transjordanie, le mandat britannique nouveau-formé avec Émir Abdallah (membre de la dynastie des Hashémites) comme dirigeant de l'État. Émir Abdallah (régnant de 1921 à 1951) a fait un compromis pendant les cinq premières années de son règne avec les leaders des tribus locales et il a commencé à créer une nouvelle identité nationale pour la Jordanie avec son ami, l'officier de l'armée britannique, John Glubb, voulant remplacer l'identité tribale par la nouvelle identité nationale de la Jordanie. A partir des années 1930, ils ont tenté de promouvoir le nationalisme jordanien parmi les arabes palestiniens. L'objectif principal d'Émir Abdallah était d'unifier les deux mandats britanniques, la Palestine et la Transjordanie qui a été partiellement réalisé après la première guerre israélo-arabe où il pouvait annexer le bord d'ouest de la rivière Jourdain. De nombreux Palestiniens ont été forcés de vivre en Jordanie dans des camps de réfugiés. Même si les Palestiniens ont reçu la citoyenneté jordanienne et les Jordaniens ont tenté de les intégrer dans la société, une lutte idéologique a éclaté entre Jordaniens et Palestiniens qui durait jusqu'aux années 1970. Dans ma communication, je répondrais à des questions comme : qu'est-ce que le nationalisme jordanien ? Comment peut-on le décrire ? Qui est Jordanien ? Quels étaient les événements majeurs de la lutte entre Jordaniens et Palestiniens pendant la période en question ?