DOI: 10.14232/suc.2024.5.73-96

Orestis Belogiannis
University of Strasbourg

Liberation or Accommodation? Phoenicians, Egyptians and Babylonians in the Twilight of the Achaemenid Empire

Mainly based on the testimony of literary sources, but also on preconceived ideas about the merits of Western civilization and the ills of Oriental despotism, the often peaceful submission of the Persian Great King's subjects to Alexander III of Macedon has been viewed as an undeniable proof of the Achaemenid Empire's fragility and oppressive system of governance. The present paper aims at challenging this view by studying the cases of Phoenicia, Egypt and Babylonia. From the critical study of classical authors, but also of textual sources coming from the empire itself, such as Babylonian cuneiform tablets, emerges a more nuanced picture in regard to the politically complicated relations between the Macedonian conqueror, the Persian authorities and the indigenous elites.

Keywords: Persian Empire, Darius III, Alexander III of Macedon, Phoenicia, Egypt, Babylon, aristocracy, satrap.

Introduction

The conquests of Alexander III of Macedon at the expense of the Persian Empire of the Achaemenid dynasty have long captivated the interest of ancient and modern historiography. Despite the abundance of studies, the history of the conflict is almost exclusively viewed from the Macedonian perspective and especially from that of the Argead monarch himself. Alexander has been praised as a brilliant tactician and an en-

lightened administrator, but also reprimanded as a sanguinary despot and a paranoid plotter.[1] By contrast, the Achaemenid Empire and its Great Kings have been relatively neglected, relegated as passive extras in the Macedonian conqueror's breathtaking performance.[2] Mentioned only briefly, the Persian Empire is generally described as a decrepit state, whose tyrannical and inefficient administration rendered it particularly vulnerable to centrifugal movements and of course to Alexander's expansionist campaign.[3] According to this interpretation, adopted even by Alexander's detractors, the subject peoples of the Levant and Mesopotamia welcomed the Macedonians as liberators, destined to free them from Persian tyranny.

Phoenicia

In chronological order, the first relevant case is that of Phoenicia. In the aftermath of the battle of Issos in Cilicia (333 BC), where the Achaemenid troops under the command of Darius III were routed, the Macedonians continued their advance southwards towards Phoenicia and Egypt. The first to recognise Alexander's suzerainty was Straton, the son of Gerostratos, king of Arados.[4] Besides Arados, Straton also offered to the Macedonian king a golden crown and the control of Marathos and

[1] For a concise overview of the historiography about Alexander, see Briant (2016: 350–414).

[2] Also visible in Oliver Stone's film *Alexander* (Briant [2016: 313–324]) despite the director's less conservative approach in other matters, like the Macedonian monarch's sexuality. For an important exception, see Briant (2003a).

[3] See, among others, Olmstead (1948: 508; 517), Hamilton (1973: 74; 85), Lane Fox (1973: 195; 250), Schachermeyr (1973: 56–57; 234–235), Green (1974: 268–269; 302–303), Bosworth (1988: 12; 86), Hammond (1997: 111) and Worthington (2014: 179; 195). For some more nuanced approaches, mostly limited however to the Achaemenid historiography, see Kuhrt–Sherwin–White (1994: 312–313), Briant (1996: 872–884), Van der Spek (2003: 341), Chauveau–Thiers (2006: 379), Heckel (2009: 36) and Briant (2016: 230–243)

[4] Curt. 4, 1, 5–6 and Arr. *Anab*. 2, 13, 7–8.

Sigon. The surrenders increased exponentially,[5] as the Macedonians advanced southwards, but the most important capitulation was that of Sidon, one of Phoenicia's major urban communities. Arrian attributes the submission of Sidon to the hatred of its population against the Persians,[6] something that is also hinted at by Diodorus.[7] However, Curtius Rufus and Justin remark that king Straton of Sidon (not to be confused with the homonymous prince of Arados) was deposed by Alexander and replaced by Abdalonymos,[8] because he hesitated about which side he should support, the Persians or the Macedonians. Following the submission of Sidon, most of Phoenicia was annexed to the nascent Argead Empire, but the last remaining major city, Tyre, proved to be a much tougher nut to crack. The Tyrians refused to submit to the Macedonians, holding instead a neutral position in the Persian-Macedonian conflict.[9] As a result, Alexander encircled the Phoenician port, which he eventually managed to capture following a lengthy and costly siege, largely thanks to the defection of the Phoenician and Cypriot naval squadrons, which deserted the Achaemenid fleet patrolling the Aegean Sea.[10]

Overall, the Macedonian conquest of Phoenicia appears to have been relatively quick, with the remarkable exception of Tyre. Inspired from Arrian's comment on the hostility of the Sidonians towards the Persians, the willingness of the Phoenicians to surrender to Alexander is explained in several modern studies as the result of how despicable the Persian domination had become among the Phoenician communities.[11]

[5] Just. *Epit*. 11, 10, 6–7.
[6] Arr. *Anab*. 2, 15, 6.
[7] Diod. Sic. 17, 40, 2.
[8] Curt. 4, 1, 15-26 and Just. 11, 10, 8–9. Cf. Diod. 17, 47 and Plut. *De Alex*. *fort*. 2, 8. On the nomination of Abdalonymos as king of Sidon, see also Briant (2003b: 33–47) and Morstadt–Riedel (2020: 191–206).
[9] Diod. Sic. 17, 40, 2–3, Curt. 4, 2, 1–5, Arr. *Anab*. 2, 16, 7–8, and Just. *Epit*. 11, 10, 10–11.
[10] Curt. 4, 3, 11 and Arr. *Anab*. 2, 20, 1–3.
[11] See, for example, Lane Fox (1973: 180), Elayi (1980: 22), Maier (1994: 330–331), Lane Fox (2007: 273) and Goukowsky (2022: 134).

Special attention is paid to the impact of the crushing of the Phoenician revolt by Artaxerxes III almost two decades ago (345 BC), which Diodorus describes in a very gloomy manner:[12] The Sidonians perished in a fiery holocaust, as they preferred to die rather than submit to Artaxerxes, while the Great King sold the smoldering remains to speculators. However, Diodorus' account is in fact quite problematic. As the obvious literary hyperboles suggest, the devastation inflicted upon Sidon seems to have been greatly exaggerated:[13] Certainly, there are indications of military operations in the area (whose dating during the reign of Artaxerxes III is however disputed[14]) and a cuneiform tablet mentions the deportation of a part of Sidon's population in Mesopotamia,[15] but, as its wealth and demographic vigour in the time of the Macedonian invasion indicate, Sidon seems to have remained a prosperous commercial hub during the reigns of the last Achaemenid monarchs. Moreover, the geographical extent of the Phoenician revolt against Artaxerxes III appears to have been quite limited. Diodorus speaks about a Phoenician uprising,[16] but, Sidon aside, the other Phoenician communities are conspicuously absent from his narration. It appears therefore that only Sidon rose against the Persians, while the other Phoenician cities, including Arados and Tyre, remained loyal to the Great King.[17]

Moreover, even in the case of Sidon, the extent of the population's hostility to the Persians should not be overestimated, given king Straton's unwillingness to openly support Alexander. Straton was not an isolated case either, as the examples of Tyre, but also of Damascus, whose dignitaries displayed a similarly ambivalent attitude in the face

[12] Diod. Sic. 16, 45, 4–6.
[13] Grainger (1991: 28–30) and Mildenberg (1999: 204–205).
[14] Grainger (1991: 25), Nitschke (2007: 123) and Wiesehöfer (2016: 107).
[15] *ABC* 9.
[16] Diod. Sic. 16, 41.
[17] Grainger (1991: 24–31) and Briant (1996: 701–703). *Contra* Olmstead (1948: 434–437), Dandamaev (1989: 307–309), Elayi (1989: 182–184) and Ruzicka (2012: 164–176).

of the Macedonian invasion,[18] demonstrate. Considering the aforementioned examples, as well as the absence of any concrete evidence documenting the allegedly widespread hostility of the Phoenicians towards the Achaemenid authorities, besides the (tenuous) case of Sidon, the submission of the Phoenician communities to the Macedonian invaders can be interpreted in more pragmatic terms:[19] In the aftermath of Issos, which sealed the Macedonian military supremacy in the Eastern Mediterranean for the foreseeable future, the allegiance to Alexander appeared politically much more expedient than remaining loyal to Darius III. Of course, the prospects of the Achaemenid Empire were not yet entirely hopeless, which explains the ambivalent attitude of the Tyrians and of Straton of Sidon, but the majority of the local elites preferred the less risky option of collaboration with the Macedonian invaders.

Egypt

Following the submission of Phoenicia and Gaza, Alexander was ready to invade the Persian satrapy of Egypt (332 – 331 BC). The situation there was particularly chaotic in the aftermath of the crushing defeat of the Persians at Issos: The satrap Sabaces had been killed during the battle[20] and was then replaced by Mazaces, presumably his deputy. In addition, the satrapy had been destabilised by a group of mercenaries led by the Macedonian Amyntas, who deserted Darius and led his men in a pil-

[18] Curt. 3, 13, 2–17. In summary, the governor of Damascus, whose name is not mentioned by Curtius Rufus, our only available source, betrayed the Persian garrison to the Macedonians, but was then decapitated by one of his subordinates, who remained loyal to Darius III. The Damascus affair illustrates the dilemma faced by the imperial elites in the aftermath of Issos and the risks involved in choosing one or the other side.
[19] Chauveau–Thiers (2006: 379) and Heckel (2009: 36). See also Green (1974: 246) and Briant (2009: 49–53).
[20] Diod. Sic. 17, 34, 5, Curt. 3, 11, 10; 4, 1, 28 and Arr. *Anab*. 2, 11, 8.

laging expedition in Egypt.[21] As Curtius Rufus reports,[22] several Egyptians joined the renegades, who then succeeded in defeating Mazaces and isolating the satrapy's garrison at Memphis. However, the Persian governor, having taken advantage of the mercenaries' preoccupation with looting the riches of the countryside, regrouped his troops and counterattacked against the mutineers, annihilating them completely. Despite his decisive victory against Amyntas, Mazaces was apparently incapable of resisting Alexander. Arrian affirms that Mazaces surrendered peacefully to the Argead monarch,[23] but Diodorus and Curtius Rufus add that the Egyptians welcomed the Macedonian occupiers,[24] because of the severity, arrogance, avarice and irreverence of the Persian administration. The cordial reception of the invaders is accepted by numerous historical studies about Alexander's conquests,[25] while some suggest that there was even a popular uprising against the Persian authorities facilitating the annexation of the Egyptian satrapy to the Macedonian kingdom.[26]

Indeed, the Persian occupation of Egypt has been regularly portrayed in a rather negative light in ancient sources: Herodotus dedicates several passages to the mistreatment of the Egyptians at the hands of Cambyses II, who supposedly did not even hesitate to slaughter the sacred Apis bull.[27] Similar sacrilegious offenses have been attributed to

[21] Diod. Sic. 17, 48, 2-5, Curt. 4, 1, 27–33 and Arr. *Anab*. 2, 13, 1–3.
[22] Curt. 4, 1, 30.
[23] Arr. *Anab*. 3, 1, 2.
[24] Diod. Sic. 17, 49, 1–2 and Curt. 4, 7, 3. The warm reception of the Macedonians by the Egyptians is also mentioned in the so-called *Oxyrhynchus Chronicle* [*P. Oxyrhynchus* I 12 (recto) col. iv, l. 32–35].
[25] See, among others, Olmstead (1948: 508), Welles (1970: 507), Hamilton (1973: 74) Lane Fox (1973: 195), Schachermeyr (1973: 234–235), Green (1974: 268–269), Lane Fox (2007: 273) and Worthington (2014: 179). Cf. Badian (1985: 433), who suggests that only the upper classes welcomed Alexander.
[26] Capart (1936: 113), Welles (1970: 507) and Heckel (2020: 118–119).
[27] Hdt. 3, 27–29. See also Diod. Sic. 1, 46, 4; 49, 5, Str. 17, 1, 27; 46, Plut. *De Is. et de Os*. 11; 44, Ael. *NA*, 10, 28; *VH*, 6, 8 and Just. *Epit*. 1, 9, 2.

Artaxerxes III, responsible for reconquering Egypt approximately one decade before Alexander's invasion. The Great King is blamed[28] for devastating the country, massacring the sacred ram of Mendes and even for devouring the Apis bull. Furthermore, a few royal inscriptions of the Lagid era[29] describe how the Ptolemaic armies managed to recover, during their campaigns against the Seleucid Empire, several statues of Egyptian deities that had been confiscated by the Persians during the occupation of the country. The aforementioned examples give the impression that the Persian rule over Egypt was particularly oppressive, which may explain the cordial welcome of the Macedonians by the Egyptian people. However, the reliability of these statements is strongly contested,[30] due to the sources' apparent bias.

For instance, regarding the claims about the recovery of the divine statues stolen by the Persians, the Ptolemaic dynasty had an interest in vilifying the Persian Empire, in order to ameliorate its reputation as the legitimate ruler of Egypt, by presenting itself as the restorer of the country's ancient glory and prosperity.[31] The credibility of the claims about the sectarian and sanguinary policies of Cambyses II and Artaxerxes III is further undermined by the obvious hyperbole and the repetitive and stereotypical literary motifs used to demonise the Persian rulers.[32] Moreover, the archaeological record of the Apis bull burials does not confirm the allegations about the disruption of the religious ceremony

[28] Diod. Sic. 16, 51, 2, Plut. *De Is. et de Os*. 11; 44, Ael. *NA*, 10, 28; *VH*, 4, 8 and Suda, *s.v. Ἄπις*; *Ἄσατο*.
[29] *Cairo CG* 31088, *Cairo CG* 50048, *OGIS* 54 and *TM* 129851. For a succinct description of the inscriptions, see Agut-Labordère (2017: 150–153).
[30] See, for example, Olmstead (1948: 89–91), Wiesehöfer (1996: 2–3), Waters (2014: 55–56) and Colburn (2020: 8–10).
[31] Colburn (2015: 177–181) and Agut-Labordère (2017: 157–162). Cf. Winnicki (1994: 177), Devauchelle (1995: 71–72) and Aufrère (2005: 140-149). For an overview of the question, see Briant (2003c: 176–181).
[32] Schwartz (1949: 68–70), Dandamaev (1989: 311), Mildenberg (1999: 205), Dillery (2005: 390–403), Henkelman (2011: 129–132) and Colburn (2020: 248).

during the reign of Cambyses,[33] which indicates that these horror stories were invented by the Egyptian clergy, in order to blacken the reputation of the Persian monarch. The hostility of the Egyptian priesthood to Cambyses is probably explained by Cambyses' fiscal reforms, which drastically curtailed the royal donations to the Egyptian temples, in an effort to reinvigorate the Egyptian economy and to render the temples financially autonomous.[34] As a result, a segment of the Egyptian society was doubtlessly not fond of the administrative policies of the Persian authorities, but this implies neither a universal hostility nor that Egypt was a monolithic society with zero conflicting interests between its members and different social classes.

In this regard, there are quite a few cases of close cooperation between Egyptians and Persians. The so-called Elephantine, Arshama and Pherendates archives reveal the frequent interactions between Persians and Egyptians, while Thucydides mentions[35] the Egyptian allies of the Persian garrison during the rebellion of Inaros (463 – 454 BC) against Artaxerxes I. However, the most iconic example is the inscription of Udjaḥorresnet,[36] an Egyptian dignitary with a very distinguished career under the last Egyptian pharaohs, but also during the reigns of Cambyses II and Darius I. Udjaḥorresnet was not an isolated example either. Another case is that of Petosiris, priest of Thoth in Hermopolis. Petosiris' career reached its peak during the second half of the 4th century BC. In his autobiography Petosirs underlines the lamentable state in which Egypt was found under an unnamed 'sovereign of the foreign

[33] Posener (1936: 168–171), Kienitz (1953: 58–59), Dillery (2005: 400) and Colburn (2020: 9). Cf. Devauchelle (1995: 66–70), Depuydt (1995: 124–126) and Aufrère (2005: 123–132).
[34] On the so-called *Cambyses Decree*, see Agut-Labordère (2005: 12–16) and Lippert (2019: 147–162).
[35] Thuc. 1, 104, 2.
[36] *Vatican* 22690. On the inscription of Udjaḥorresnet and his career, see respectively Posener (1936: 1–29) and Cruz-Uribe (2003: 10–15).

lands', when Petosiris began his illustrious career. This is a common literary motif, designed to emphasise the magnitude of the dignitary's subsequent achievements.[37] In fact, not only did Petosiris succeed in surviving the transition from Egypt's last indigenous pharaohs to the Persian Great Kings and then to the Macedonian dynasties, but the Persian themes of the iconographic decoration of his tomb might indicate his close association with the Achaemenid authorities.[38] Contemporary with Petosiris was Somtutefnakht.[39] Somtutefnakht not only managed to survive the tumultuous period between the reconquest of Artaxerxes III and the invasion of Alexander, similarly to Petosiris, but the inscription also mentions his participation in a battle against the Greeks (Issos?), where Somtutefnakht presumably fought in the side of the Persians.[40]

The cases of Petosiris and Somtutefnakht indicate the flexibility of the local elites, who were ready to accommodate themselves with Egypt's new rulers, in order to maintain their privileged position. This conclusion is corroborated by the behaviour of several members of the imperial administration. Starting from the lower echelons of the hierarchy, Arrian mentions[41] the nomination of two Egyptians, Petisas and Doloaspis, as nomarchs (civilian governors of a territorial subdivision of the satrapy), who may have also been administrative officials under the Persians.[42] In fact, despite being described as an Egyptian, the name Doloaspis is actually of Iranian etymology.[43] In addition, Amminapis, an Iranian official that surrendered to Alexander in Egypt, was later

[37] Cf. Ladynin (2005: 108–109), Kuhrt (2007: 120) and Colburn (2015: 185–186).
[38] Colburn (2015: 186–194).
[39] *Naples* 1035. On Somtutefnakht's inscription, see Tresson (1930: 382–391), Lichtheim (1980: 41–44), Perdu (1985: 92–113) and Menu (1995: 86–90).
[40] Tresson (1930: 390–391), Perdu (1985: 108), Dandamaev (1989: 324), Burstein (1994: 382), Briant (1996: 879), Ruzicka (2012: 278) and Wojciechowska (2016: 61). *Contra* Welles (1970: 509).
[41] Arr. *Anab*. 3, 5, 2.
[42] Burstein (2000: 154).
[43] Briant (1996: 739).

given the satrapy of Parthia and Hyrcania,[44] in north-eastern Iran. As for Mazaces, Arrian and Curtius Rufus mention that he submitted to Alexander in an amicable manner,[45] which indicates that the last Persian satrap of Egypt also tried to gain the goodwill of the Macedonian conqueror. As he then disappears from the available narrative sources, Mazaces' subsequent career remains unknown, but a few silver tetradrachms discovered in modern-day Iraq may indicate that he was later appointed governor of a Mesopotamian district (Assyria?).[46]

Overall, the cases of Petosirs, Somtutefnakht, Petisas, Doloaspis, Amminapis and even Mazaces provide us with a more nuanced image of the circumstances of Egypt's surrender to the Macedonians than Curtius Rufus' and Diodorus' one-dimensional narrative of the Egyptians enthusiastically welcoming the Macedonian invaders. There is no reason to doubt the frustration caused by the fiscal demands of the Persian administration or that the Egyptian society was relieved by the restauration of order, following the anarchy caused by the death of Sabaces and the subsequent invasion of Amyntas (despite Curtius Rufus' surprising and unconvincing remark that some Egyptians had joined the pillaging bands of mercenaries), but the warm reception of the conquerors is more indicative of the elite's pragmatism and willingness to integrate itself into the new *status quo*[47] than of their supposed visceral hatred against the Persians. A few months later, Babylon will submit to Alexander in remarkably similar conditions.

[44] Curt. 6, 4, 25 and Arr. *Anab*. 3, 22, 1.
[45] Curt. 4, 7, 4 and Arr. *Anab*. 3, 1, 2.
[46] Nicolet-Pierre (1979: 229), Harrison (1982: 386–387), Van Alfen (2000: 31–41) and especially Le Rider (2003: 284–290).
[47] Burstein (1994: 382–383), Briant (1996: 878–881), Briant (2003a: 84) and Schäfer (2009: 150).

Babylon

Following the Persian defeat at Gaugamela (331 BC), Darius retreated eastwards, towards Media, which meant that no standing army could oppose the march of Alexander southwards, towards the prosperous cities of Babylonia. The first major strategic obstacle for Alexander was Babylon itself, the satrapy's capital. The satrap Mazaeus, described as an illustrious dignitary and a friend of Darius,[48] was the *de facto* governor of the city,[49] whose defenses were bolstered by its imposing fortifications,[50] as well as by its irrigation system, whose manipulation could flood the surrounding plains, thus sabotaging any attempt to encircle the Mesopotamian metropolis. However, despite Mazaeus' close association with Darius and Babylon's formidable defenses, the city surrendered without a fight to Alexander. Arrian mentions[51] that, as he approached Babylon, Alexander deployed his troops in battle formation, but the Babylonians, the local administration and clergy included, welcomed the conquerors, also offering them precious gifts. The narration of Curtius Rufus is more detailed, but, in general, it confirms Arrian's account:[52] Mazaeus, having marched outside Babylon and accompanied by his adult sons, submitted to Alexander, to whom he surrendered Babylon and its citadel. After enumerating the strategic advantages of the city's peaceful surrender for the Argead monarch, Curtius Rufus proceeds to describe the magnificent reception the Babylonians organ-

[48] Diod. Sic. 17, 55, 1 and Curt. 5, 1, 18.
[49] During Alexander's invasion, Mazaeus initially administered the satrapy of Syria/Transeuphratene (Arr. *Anab*. 3, 8, 6), but he took over the governorship of Babylon following the Persian defeat at Gaugamela, perhaps because the previous satrap (Boupares? [Arr. *Anab*. 3, 8, 5]) had been killed during the hostilities (Briant [1996: 868], cf. Bosworth [1980: 291]).
[50] Curt. 5, 1, 17. See also Heinsch–Kuntner (2011: 525–526).
[51] Arr. *Anab*. 3, 16, 3–4.
[52] Curt. 6, 1, 3–44.

ised for the new masters of the city: The Macedonians entered the city in square formation. Alexander paraded on top of a chariot, from where he inspected the riches of the city and the luxurious decorations, arranged by Bagophanes,[53] the phrourarch and treasurer of Babylon,[54] in an effort to compete with Mazaeus. Present in the ceremony were the Chaldeans (the Babylonian priesthood) and the Babylonian cavalry, donned in splendid uniforms and doubtlessly representing the urban aristocracy of Babylon. Finally, Diodorus' account is much more concise, but the Sicilian historian confirms the willing submission of the Babylonians.[55]

Given Mazaeus' illustrious career under Darius and especially Babylon's near-impregnable defenses, how can we explain the peaceful surrender of the city that most likely constituted the most important urban center of the Achaemenid Empire in economic and demographic terms? Traditionally, the sudden and without resistance fall of Babylon has been attributed to the supposed hostility of the Babylonian society to the foreign and presumably despised administration of the Persian authorities.[56] This interpretation is mainly based on Arrian's remark[57] that Alexander decreed that the Babylonians should repair their temples and especially that of Belos (the Ésagila, the temple of Marduk, Babylon's protector god), which Xerxes I had destroyed. In combination with some

[53] Bagophanes' name has been very heavily hellenised, but it most likely corresponds to the Iranian name Bagapâna (Dandamaev [1992: 58–59]), which implies that Bagophanes, similarly to Mazaeus, was of Iranian origins.
[54] In this context, the term phrourach (originating from the Greek word φρούραρχος) corresponds to the commander of the citadel's garrison. The treasurer (*ganzabara* in Old Persian) was responsible for the financial administration of the province under his jurisdiction.
[55] Diod. Sic. 17, 64, 4–5.
[56] See, *inter alia*, Olmstead (1948: 517), Hamilton (1973: 85), Lane Fox (1973: 250), Green (1974: 302–303), Bosworth (1988: 86), Hammond (1997: 111) and Worthington (2014: 195). Schachermeyr (1970: 56–57) suggests that Babylon was impossible to defend, because of the outbreak of a popular anti-Achaemenid uprising.
[57] Arr. *Anab*. 3, 16, 4.

other circumstantial evidence,[58] it is thus argued that Xerxes quelled the Babylonian revolts of Šamaš-eriba and Bêl-šimânni (484 BC) in a particularly harsh and sectarian manner,[59] which caused an irreparable rift between Persians and Babylonians. However, this hypothesis has been strongly contested by a reexamination of the available evidence,[60] which led to a more nuanced understanding of Xerxes' policy in the aftermath of the Babylonian uprisings. Regarding the archaeological evidence, there are signs of damage and abandonment in a Babylonian neighborhood and in Etemenanki, the city's great ziggurat dedicated to Marduk,[61] but their interpretation has divided the scientific community. Not only is the dating of the damage disputed, but it might also be attributed to military operations, instead of a coordinated campaign of sectarian vandalism.[62]

In any case, even if the Ésagila was indeed damaged during the restauration of Achaemenid rule over Babylonia, neither was the prosperity of the sanctuary irreparably condemned, as the continuation of its activities in the later period shows,[63] nor was said damage the result

[58] In summary, it has been alleged that Xerxes abolished the Babylonian kingship, divided the satrapy of Mesopotamia, persecuted the Babylonian cults out of religious intolerance and even confiscated the statue of Marduk from the Ésagila. The last two points are based respectively on the so-called *Daivâ Inscription* (*XPh*), whose content is however very generic and stereotypical and, therefore, of limited historical value, and on a passage of Herodotus' *Histories* (1, 183, 3), which has been however misinterpreted (Kuhrt–Sherwin-White [1987: 71–72] and Rollinger [1998: 350–355]).

[59] See, for example, Nyberg (1938: 364–367), Olmstead (1948: 236–237), Duchesne-Guillemin (1962: 156), Schmidt (1970: 117–118) and Dandamaev (1989: 183–187).

[60] Kuhrt–Sherwin-White (1987: 69–78). See also Rollinger (1998: 339–373).

[61] Mallwitz et al. (1957: 29–33).

[62] On the various interpretations of the archaeological evidence regarding Xerxes' policy towards Babylon, see, among others, Schmid (1995: 92–94), Rollinger (1998: 350–355), Baker (2008: 113–115), George (2010: 474–480), Allinger-Csollich (2011: 533–555), Heinsch et al. (2011: 489–490), Henkelman et al. (2011: 458–461) and Briant (2016: 239–240).

[63] Kuhrt–Sherwin-White (1987: 75–76), Stolper (1989: 295) and Heller (2010: 298). Hackl (2018: 16–185) summarises the Ésagila archive of the later Achaemenid and early Hellenistic periods, also describing the changes implemented in the temple's administration following the victory of Xerxes over the Babylonian insurgents.

of Xerxes' alleged sectarianism, as his policy appears to have been purely pragmatic. For instance, the decline in the beginning of Xerxes' reign of the old aristocratic families of Babylon, which used to dominate the city's economy and politics since the Neo-Babylonian period and which cooperated with the Babylonian rebels, is clearly visible through the cuneiform archives. However, the same sources also attest the rise of a new Babylonian elite, closely attached to the Persian administration,[64] whose uninterrupted prosperity indicates Babylon's blossoming economy during the middle and late Achaemenid periods.

So, if Babylonian and Persian elites continued to coexist and cooperate with mutual profit even after Xerxes' reign, how to explain the cordial reception of the Macedonians? A glimpse of the answer can be provided by a cuneiform astronomical tablet, which seemingly corroborates Arrian's testimony: In Sippar, a city situated to the north of Babylon, Alexander promised to abstain from harming the inhabitants of Babylon: He would not enter inside their houses and he would renovate the Ésagila.[65] The remark about the renovation of the temple does not however confirm Arrian's allegations. Even if it is not just a generic and stereotypical comment designed to underline the Macedonian ruler's piety and generosity, Babylonian buildings, composed mainly of fragile mudbricks, were in constant need of maintenance and repair.[66] Moreover, the promises of Alexander in Sippar, made before the Macedonians even reached Babylon, reveal the conditional and contractual nature of the city's surrender, which is also implied by the welcoming committee headed by Mazaeus and mentioned by Curtius Rufus: In ex-

[64] On the socio-economic dynamics of the Babylonian revolts as well as on the impact of Xerxes' pacification policy, see especially Waerzeggers (2003/2004: 150–163) and Seire–Waerzeggers ed. (2018).
[65] *ADART* 1. On the tablet in question, see Bernard (1990: 525–528) and Van der Spek (2003: 297–299).
[66] Kuhrt (1990: 187–188), Collins (2013: 137–138) and Briant (2016: 239–240).

change for respecting the properties and privileged social positions of the Babylonian elites, Alexander would be recognised as the legitimate ruler of Babylon. This agreement also concerned the Persian officials of the imperial administration. Bagophanes did not keep his office as the city's garrison commander and treasurer, but he was instead incorporated into Alexander's circle.[67] On the other hand, Mazaeus was not only confirmed as satrap of Babylonia, one of the empire's wealthiest regions, perhaps the first Iranian to enjoy such an honour,[68] but was even authorised to mint his own coins.[69] The aforementioned rewards, as well as the reference of the astronomical tablet to the agreement between the Macedonians and the local elites preceding the official surrender of the city, highlight the conditional submission of Babylon, thus contradicting its interpretation as a spontaneous and enthusiastic initiative.

How then to explain Arrian's remark about the alleged cruelty and intolerance of Xerxes? It could be a rhetorical invention of the classical literature, inspired from Xerxes' tarnished reputation in Greece as the arsonist of Athens.[70] Alternatively, the stark contrast between the piety and popularity of Babylon's new masters and the supposed irreverence and blasphemous policies of their predecessors is a common motif in Babylonian history. For instance, the Babylonian sources underline the warm welcome the Assyrian king Sargon II received, when

[67] Curt. 5, 1, 44.

[68] Unless we take into consideration the appointment of Sabictas/Abistamenes as governor of Cappadocia by Alexander (Curt. 3, 4, 1 and Arr. *Anab*. 2, 4, 2). However, neither his ethnic origins nor his earlier position in the Achaemenid society and bureaucratic hierarchy are clear (Lerouge-Cohen [2022: 198–201]).

[69] Curt. 5, 1, 44 and Arr. *Anab*. 3, 16, 4. His sons also joined the elite cavalry regiment of the Macedonian army (Arr. *Anab*. 7, 6, 4).

[70] Sancisi-Weerdenburg (2002: 580–588) and Kuhrt (2007: 248). Cf. Van der Spek (2003: 341). *Contra* Lane Fox (2007: 300). Tolini (2012: 276–277) suggests that Xerxes was chosen as the convenient scapegoat, because he was responsible for reforming the administration and economy of the Babylonian temples, thus undermining the revenues of the clergy.

he captured Babylon from the local ruler Marduk-apla-iddina II.[71] The most iconic example, however, is that of the so-called *Cyrus Cylinder*, concerning, ironically enough, the Persian conquest of Babylon. In the cuneiform text in question, Cyrus II is praised as a generous and pious leader, while his adversary, the Babylonian Nabonidus, is consistently denigrated as an irresponsible, incompetent and blasphemous despot.[72] The examples of Sargon, Cyrus and Alexander demonstrate the political and ideological intricacies behind the various dynastic transitions in Babylon.[73] On one hand, the submission of Babylon was the product of a prearranged agreement, whose terms were mutually beneficial to the signatories (the foreign invaders and the indigenous elites), at the expense of the deposed dynasty. On the other hand, for propaganda and legitimacy purposes, the surrender was publicly presented in a less cynical manner as the fortunate result of the conqueror's generosity and piety, in direct contrast to the previous regime's supposedly arbitrary and impious policies.

Conclusion

To recapitulate, in all three cases, the classical sources refer, albeit in a usually brief and generic manner, to how warmly the indigenous communities received the Macedonian conquerors.[74] This is generally attributed by the modern historiography to Alexander's enlightened policies and to the political oppression and economic stagnation of the Achaemenid Empire.[75] However, the details about the communi-

[71] Kuhrt (1990: 122–123) and Del Monte (2001: 141).
[72] Waerzeggers (2015: 95–119). On the parallels between the idealised representations of Cyrus and Alexander in the cuneiform documents, see Tolini (2012: 279–289).
[73] Sherwin–White (1987: 8–9), Van der Spek (2003: 341) and Briant (2009: 49–53).
[74] Diod. 17, 40, 2; 49, 1–2; 64, 4–5, Curt. 4, 7, 3; 5, 1, 3–4 and Arr. *Anab*. 2, 15, 6; 3, 16, 3–4.
[75] For a concise overview of the relevant historiography, Briant (2016: 230–255).

ties' submissions, often included in the narrations of these very same sources, provide us with a more nuanced explanation of the local elites' motivations. Cases like these of Tyre and Straton of Sidon, who hesitated over the course to follow, and especially those of Amminapis and Mazaeus, who were amply rewarded by Alexander for their new allegiance, indicate the political dilemmas faced by the implicated dignitaries, as well as their principally pragmatic motivations. This interpretation is further reinforced by the testimony of cuneiform and hieroglyphic sources, which, unlike Curtius Rufus, Arrian and Diodorus Siculus, directly echo the perspectives of the communities involved, although they are not impartial either. The socio-political survival of the Babylonian and Egyptian aristocracies (see especially Petosiris and Somtutefnakht) during the transition from local to Persian and then to Macedonian domination, as well as their successful integration into the new *status quo*, demonstrate the political flexibility and adaptability of the elites in question. So, if the answer to the question posed in the title is accommodation, how to explain the frequent allusions to liberation?

The solution to this puzzle can be more clearly detected in the Babylonian example, where the relative abundance of the cuneiform documentation allows us to examine the legitimisation tactics employed by the local elites in a rather long period, beginning even before the establishment of the Persian Empire. The new masters of Babylon are consistently glorified as benevolent and pious administrators, while the previous regime is condemned for its alleged irreverence and authoritarianism. Can the Babylonian example be generalised to include Phoenicia and Egypt as well? The answer to this question is most probably positive. The situation in Phoenicia is generally opaque, due to the scarcity of sources, but in Ptolemaic Egypt we can notice the same legitimisation schema in the systematic denigration of the Persian domination, rhetorically contrasted with the prosperity and glory the country sup-

posedly achieved under the Ptolemies.[76] In conclusion, the elites of the invaded satrapies, represented not only by the indigenous aristocracy, but also by the (mostly Persian) officials of the upper echelons of the imperial bureaucracy, chose accommodation over resistance, especially when the prospects of Darius III collapsed after Gaugamela. However, the narrative of liberation was used to politically justify their rapprochement with Alexander, in a double effort to facilitate their rupture with the Persian authorities and their subsequent incorporation into Alexander's administration, but also to consolidate the legitimacy of the rising Macedonian dynasties, like the Argeads and the Lagids.

Bibliography

Agut-Labordère 2005 D. Agut-Labordère: *Le sens du Décret de Cambyse*. Transeuphratène 29 (2005) 9–16.

Agut-Labordère 2017 D. Agut-Labordère: *Persianism through Persianization: The Case of Ptolemaic Egypt*. In: R. Strootman – M. Versluys (eds.): Persianism in Antiquity. Stuttgart 2017, 147–162.

Allinger-Csollich 2011 W. Allinger-Csollich: *Die Ziqqurrat von Babylon nach dem archäologischen Befund: Auch ein Beitrag zu Herodots babylonischen Logos*. In: R. Bichler – R. Rollinger – B. Truschnegg (eds.): Herodot und das persische Weltreich. Wiesbaden 2011, 531–556.

Aufrère 2005 S. Aufrère: *La destruction des Perses en Égypte et de Cambyse en particulier – topos ou réalité ?*. In: J.-M. Marconot – B. Tabuce (eds.): Iconoclamse et vandalisme : la violence et l'image. Montpellier 2005, 115–158.

Badian 1985 E. Badian: *Alexander in Iran*. In: I. Gershevitch (ed.): Cambridge History of Iran II: The Median and Achaemenian Periods. Cambridge 1985, 420–501.

Baker 2008 H. Baker: *Babylonia in 484 B.C.: The Excavated Archival Tablets as a Source for Urban History*. Zeitschrift für Assyriologie und vorderasiatische Archäologie 98 (2008) 100–116.

Bernard 1990 P. Bernard: *Nouvelle contribution de l'épigraphie cunéiforme à l'histoire hellénistique*. Bulletin de correspondance hellénique 114 (1990) 513–541.

[76] Colburn (2015: 168–181).

Bosworth 1980 A. Bosworth. *A Historical Commentary on Arrian's History of Alexander. Volume I: Commentary on Books I–III*. Oxford 1980.

Bosworth 1988 A. Bosworth: *Conquest and Empire*. Cambridge 1988.

Briant 1996 P. Briant: *Histoire de l'empire perse, de Cyrus à Alexandre*. Paris 1996.

Briant 2003a P. Briant: *Darius dans l'ombre d'Alexandre*. Paris 2003.

Briant 2003b P. Briant: *New Trends in Achaemenid History*. Ancient History Bulletin 17 (2003) 34–37.

Briant 2003c P. Briant: *Quand les rois écrivent l'histoire : la domination achéménide vue à travers les inscriptions officielles lagides*. In: N. Grimal (ed.): Événements, récit, histoire officielle : l'écriture de l'histoire dans les monarchies antiques. Paris 2003, 173–186.

Briant 2009 P. Briant: *The Empire of Darius III in Perspective*. In: W. Heckel (ed.): Alexander the Great: A New History. New Jersey 2009, 141–170.

Briant 2016 P. Briant: *Alexandre : exégèse des liens communs*. Paris 2016.

Burstein 1994 S. Burstein: *Alexander in Egypt: Continuity or Change*?. In: A. Kuhrt – H. Sancisi-Weerdenburg – M. Root (eds.): Achaemenid History VIII: Continuity and Change. Leiden 1994, 381–387.

Burstein 2000 S. Burstein: *Prelude to Alexander: The Reign of Khababash*. Ancient History Bulletin 14 (2000) 149–154.

Capart 1936 J. Capart: *Histoire de l'Orient ancien : l'Égypte des pharaons*. Paris 1936.

Chauveau–Thiers 2006 M. Chauveau – C. Thiers: *L'Égypte en transition : des Perses aux Macédoniens*. In: P. Briant – F. Joannès (eds.): La transition entre l'empire achéménide et les royaumes hellénistiques. Paris 2006, 375–404.

Colburn 2015 H. Colburn: *Memories of the Second Persian Period in Egypt*. In: J. Silverman – C. Waerzeggers (eds.): Political Memory in and after the Persian Empire. Atlanta 2015, 165–202.

Colburn 2020 H. Colburn: *Archaeology of Empire in Achaemenid Egypt*. Edinburgh 2020.

Collins 2013 A. Collins: *Alexander the Great and the Kingship of Babylon*. Ancient History Bulletin 27 (2013) 130–148.

Cruz-Uribe 2003 E. Cruz-Uribe: *The Invasion of Egypt by Cambyses*. Transeuphratène 25 (2003) 9–60.

Dandamaev 1989 M. Dandamaev: *A Political History of the Achaemenid Empire*. Leiden 1989.

Del Monte 2001 G. Del Monte: *Da 'barbari' a 're di Babilonia': I Greci in Mesopotamia*. In: S. Settis (ed.): I Greci. Storia, culture, arte, società III: Greci oltre la Grecia. Turin 2001, 137–166.

Depuydt 1995 L. Depuydt: *The Story of Cambyses' Mortal Wounding of the Apis Bull (ca 523 BCE)*. Journal of Near Eastern Studies 54 (1995) 119–126.

Devauchelle 1995 D. Devauchelle: *Le sentiment anti-perse chez les anciens Égyptiens*. Transeuphratène 9 (1995) 67–80.

Dillery 2005 J. Dillery: *Cambyses and the Egyptian Chaosbeschreibung tradition*. Classical Quarterly 55 (2005) 387–406.

Duchesne – Guillemin 1962

J. Duchesne–Guillemin. *La religion de l'Iran ancien*. Paris 1962.

Elayi 1980 J. Elayi: *The Phoenician Cities in the Persian Period*. Journal of the Association of Near Eastern Studies 12 (1980) 13–28.

Elayi 1989 J. Elayi: *Sidon, cité autonome de l'empire Perse*. Paris 1989.

George 2010 A. George: *Xerxes and the Tower of Babel*. In: J. Curtis – J. Simpson (eds.): The World of Achaemenid Persia: History, Art and Society in Iran and the Ancient Near East. London 2010, 471–481.

Goukowsky 2022 P. Goukowsky: *Arrien – Anabase d'Alexandre : Introduction générale, livres I & II*. Paris 2022.

Grainger 1991 J. Grainger: *Hellenistic Phoenicia*. Oxford 1991.

Green 1974 P. Green: *Alexander of Macedon (356–323 B.C.): A Historical Biography*. Oxford 1974.

Hackl 2018 J. Hackl: *The Esagila Temple during the Late Achaemenid Period and the Impact of Xerxes' Reprisals on the Northern Babylonian Households*. In: M. Seire – C. Waerzeggers (eds.): Xerxes and Babylonia: The Cuneiform Evidence. Leuven 2018, 165–188.

Hamilton 1973 J. Hamilton: *Alexander the Great*. London 1973.

Hammond 1997 N. Hammond: *The Genius of Alexander the Great*. Chapel Hill 1997.

Harrison 1982 C. Harrison: *Coins of the Persian Satraps*. Ph.D. diss. University of Pennsylvania 1982.

Heckel 2009 W. Heckel: *Alexander's Conquest of Asia*. In: W. Heckel (ed.): Alexander the Great: A New History. New Jersey 2009, 26–52.

Heckel 2020 W. Heckel: *In the Path of Conquest: Resistance to Alexander the Great*. New York 2020.

Heinsch et al. 2011 S. Heinch – W. Kuntner – R. Rollinger: *Von Herodot zur angeblichen Verödung babylonischer Stadtviertel in achaimenidischer Zeit: Kritische Bemerkungen zum archäologischen Befund auf dem Merkes sowie zur vermeintlichen Zerstörung des Tempels der Iš̆tar von Akkade durch Xerxes im Jahre 484 v. Chr.*. In: R. Bichler – R. Rollinger – B. Truschnegg (eds.): Herodot und das persische Weltreich. Wiesbaden 2011, 471–498.

Heinsch–Kuntner 2011

S. Heinsch – W. Kuntner: *Herodot und die Stadtmauern Babylons*.

In: R. Bichler – R. Rollinger – B. Truschnegg (eds.): Herodot und das persische Weltreich. Wiesbaden 2011, 499–530.

Heller 2010 A. Heller: *Das Babylonien der Spätzeit (7. – 4. Jahrhundert) in den klassischen und keilschriftlichen Quellen*. Berlin 2010.

Henkelman 2011 W. Henkelman: *Der Grabhügel*. In: G. Lanfranchi – R. Rollinger – J. Wiesehöfer (eds.): Ktesias' Welt, Ctesias' World. Wiesbaden 2011, 111–139.

Henkelman et al. 2011

W. Henkelman – A. Kuhrt – R. Rollinger – J. Wiesehöfer: *Herodotus and Babylon Reconsidered*. In: R. Bichler – R. Rollinger – B. Truschnegg (eds.): Herodot und das persische Weltreich. Wiesbaden 2011, 449–470.

Kienitz 1953 F. Kienitz: *Die politische Geshichte Ägyptens vom 7. bis 4. Jahrhundert vor der Zeitwende*. Leipzig 1953.

Kuhrt 1990 A. Kuhrt: *Alexander and Babylon*. In: J. Drijvers – H. Sancisi-Weerdenburg (eds.): Achaemenid History V: The Roots of the European Tradition. Leiden 1990, 121–130.

Kuhrt 2007 A. Kuhrt: *The Persian Empire: A Corpus of Sources from the Achaemenid Period*. London 2007.

Kuhrt–Sherwin-White 1987

A. Kuhrt – S. Sherwin-White: *Xerxes' Destruction of Babylonian Temples*. In: A. Kuhrt – H. Sancisi-Weerdenburg (eds.): Achaemenid History II: The Greek Sources. Leiden 1987, 69–78.

Kuhrt–Sherwin-White 1994

A. Kuhrt – S. Sherwin-White: *The Transition from Achaemenid to Seleucid Rule in Babylonia: Revolution or Evolution?*. In: A. Kuhrt – H. Sancisi-Weerdenburg – M. Root (eds.): Achaemenid History VIII: Continuity and Change. Leiden 1994, 311–327.

Ladynin 2006 I. Ladynin: *'Adversary Hšryš': His Name and Deeds According to the Satrap Stela. Chronique d'Égypte 80 (2006) 87–113*.

Lane Fox 1973 R. Lane Fox: *Alexander the Great*. London 1973.

Lane Fox 2007 R. Lane Fox: *Alexander the Great: 'Last of the Achaemenids'?*. In: C. Tuplin (ed.): Persian Responses: Political and Cultural Interaction with(in) the Achaemenid Empire. Llandysul 2007, 267–311.

Le Rider 2003 G. Le Rider: *Alexandre le Grand : monnaie, finances et politiques*. Paris 2003.

Lerouge-Cohen 2022

C. Lerouge-Cohen: *Souvenirs du passé perse à l'époque hellénistique : Arménie, Cappadoce, Commagène, Perside, royaume arsacide*. Paris 2022.

Lichtheim 1980 M. Liechtheim: *Ancient Egyptian Literature III: The Late Period*. Berkeley 1980.

Lippert 2019 S. Lippert: *Zur Situation ägyptischer Hëligturmer in der 27. Dynastie (1. Perserherrschaft).* In: R. Achenbach (ed.): Persische Reichspolitik und lokale Heligtümer. Wiesbaden 2019, 147–162.

Maier 1994 F. Maier: *Cyprus and Phoenicia*. In: J. Boardman – S. Hornblower – D. Lewis – M. Ostwald (eds.): Cambridge Ancient History VI: The Fourth Century B.C.. Cambridge 1994, 297–336.

Mallwitz et al. 1957 A. Mallwitz – E. Schmidt – F. Wetzel: *Das Babylon der Spätzeit*. Berlin 1957.

Menu 1995 B. Menu: *Les carrières des Égyptiens à l'étranger sous les dominations perses : les critères de justification, leur évolution et leurs limites*. Transeuphratène 9 (1995) 81–90.

Mildenberg 1999 L. Mildenberg: *Artaxerxes III Ochus (359–338 B.C.): A Note on the Maligned King.* Zeitschrift des Deutschen Palästina-Vereins 115 (1999) 201–227.

Morstadt–Riedel 2020 B. Morstadt – S. Riedel: *Cultivating Kingship? The Remarkable Career of Abdalonymos from Gardener to King of Sidon*. In: W. Held (ed.): The Transition from the Achaemenid to the Hellenistic Period in the Levant, Cyprus and Cilicia: Cultural Interruption or Continuity? Marburg 2020, 191–208.

Nicolet-Pierre 1979 H. Nicolet-Pierre: *Les monnaies des deux derniers satrapes d'Égypte avant la conquête d'Alexandre*. In: O. Mørkholm – N. Waggoner (eds.): Greek Numismatics and Archaeology: Essays in Honor of Margaret Thompson. Wetteren 1979, 221–230.

Nitschke 2007 J. Nitschke: *Perceptions of Culture: Interpreting Greco – Near Eastern Hybridity in the Phoenician Homeland*. Berkeley 2007.

Nyberg 1938 H. Nyberg: *Die Religionen des alten Iran*. Leipzig 1938.

Olmstead 1948 A. Olmstead: *History of the Persian Empire*. Chicago 1948.

Perdu 1985 O. Perdu: *Le monument de Samtoutefnakht à Naples*. Revue d'Égyptologie 36 (1985) 89–113.

Posener 1936 G. Posener: *La première domination perse en Égypte. Recueil d'inscriptions hiéroglyphiques*. Cairo 1936.

Rollinger 1998 R. Rollinger: *Überlegungen zu Herodot, Xerxes und dessen angeblicher Zerstörung Babylons*. Altorientalische Forschungen 25 (1998) 339–373.

Ruzicka 2012 S. Ruzicka: *Trouble in the West: Egypt and the Persian Empire, 525–332 B.C.*. Oxford 2012.

Sancisi-Weerdenburg 2002 H. Sancisi-Weerdenburg. *The Personality of Xerxes, King of Kings*.

In: E. Bakker – I. de Jong – H. van Weer (eds.): Brill's Companion to Herodotus. Leiden 2002, 579–590.

Schachermeyr 1970 F. Schachermeyr: *Alexander in Babylon und die Reichsordnung nach seinem Tode*. Vienna 1970.

Schachermeyr 1973 F. Schachermeyr: *Alexander der Grosse: Das Problem seiner Persönlichkeit und seines Wirkens*. Vienna 1973.

Schäfer 2009 D. Schäfer: *Persian Foes – Ptolemaic Friends? The Persians on the Satrap Stela*. In: P. Briant – M. Chauveau (eds.): Organisation des pouvoirs et contacts culturels dans le pays de l'empire achéménide : actes du colloque organisé au Collège de France, Paris 2009, 143–152.

Schmid 1995 H. Schmid: *Der Tempelturm Etemenanki in Babylon*. Mainz 1995.

Schmidt 1970 E. Schmidt: *The Royal Tombs and Their Monuments*. Chicago 1970.

Schwartz 1949 J. Schwartz: *Les conquérants perses et la littérature égyptienne*. Bulletin de l'Institut Français d'Archéologie Orientale 48 (1949) 65–80.

Seire–Waerzeggers 2018

M. Seire – C. Waerzeggers (eds.): *Xerxes and Babylonia: The Cuneiform Evidence*. Leuven 2018.

Sherwin-White 1987

S. Sherwin-White: *Seleucid Babylonia: A Case Study for the Installation and Development of Greek Rule*. In: A. Kuhrt – S. Sherwin-White (eds.): Hellenism in the East: The Interaction of Greek and Non-Greek Civilizations from Syria to Central Asia after Alexander. London 1987, 1–31.

Stolper 1989 M. Stolper: *The Governor of Babylonia and Across-the-River in 486 B.C.*. Journal of Near Eastern Studies 48 (1989) 283–306.

Tolini 2012 G. Tolini: *Le discours de domination de Cyrus, de Darius I^er^ et d'Alexandre le Grand sur la Babylonie*. In: V. Dieudonné – C. Feyel – J. Fournier – L. Graslin – F. Kirbilher – G. Vottéro (eds.): Communautés locales et pouvoir central dans l'Orient hellénistique et romain. Nancy 2012, 259–296.

Tresson 1930 P. Tresson: *La stèle de Naples.* Bulletin de l'Institut Français d'Archéologie Orientale 30 (1930) 369–391.

Van Alfen 2000 P. van Alfen: *The 'Owls' from the 1973 Iraq Hoard*. American Journal of Numismatics 12 (2000) 9–58.

Van der Spek 2003 R. van der Spek: *Darius III, Alexander the Great and Babylonian Scholarship.* In: A. Kuhrt – W. Henkelman (eds.): Achaemenid History XIII: A Persian Perspective. Leiden 2003, 289–346.

Waerzeggers 2003/2004

C. Waerzeggers: *The Babylonian Revolts against Xerxes and the 'End of the Archives'*. Archiv für Orientforschung 50 (2003/2004) 150–173.

Waerzeggers 2015 C. Waerzeggers: *Facts, Propaganda or History? Shaping Political Memory in the Nabonidus Chronicle*. In: J. Silverman – C. Waerzeggers (eds.): Political Memory in and after the Persian Empire. Atlanta 2015, 95-124.

Waters 2014 M. Waters: *Ancient Persia: A Concise History of the Achaemenid Empire, 550–330 BCE*. Cambridge 2014.

Welles 1970 C. Welles: *The Egyptians under the First Ptolemies*. In: D. Samuel (ed.): Proceedings of the 12th International Congress of Papyrology. Toronto 1970, 505–510.

Wiesehöfer 2016 J. Wiesehöfer: *Fourth Century Revolts against Persia: The Test Case of Sidon (348–345 BCE)*. In: L. Brice – T. Howe (eds.): Brill's Companion to Insurgency and Terrorism in the Ancient Mediterranean. Leiden 2016, 93–116.

Winnicki 1994 J. Winnicki: *Carrying off and Bringing Home the Statues of the Gods: On an Aspect of the Religious Policy of the Ptolemies towards the Egyptians*. Journal of Juristic Papyroloy 24 (1994) 149–190.

Wojciechowska 2016 A. Wojciechowska: *From Amyrtaeus to Ptolemy*. Wiesbaden 2016.

Worthington 2014 I. Worthington: *By the Spear: Philip II, Alexander the Great and the Rise and Fall of the Macedonian Empire*. New York 2014.